Why Operationism Doesn't Go Away: Extrascientific Incentives of Social-Psychological Research by Rosenwald, George C.
303-
Why Operationism Doesn’t Go Away:
Extrascientific Incentives of
Social-Psychological Research*&dagger;
GEORGE C. ROSENWALD, Psychology, University of Michigan
Give me where to stand and I shall move the earth.
&mdash;Archimedes
Theoretical progress, as envisioned within the discipline of social
psychology, is slow to arrive (Gergen 1982; Meehl 1978; Scriven 1964).
Investigators committed to the experimental method, the method often
deemed most powerful of all, account for this by referring to the com-
plexity of the subject matter; others point a finger at the experimen-
talists’ methodological commitment itself (Allport 1961; Giorgi 1970;
Harr6 and Secord 1972). Perhaps both sides are right. In any case, people
beset by the large and small perplexities of life rarely turn to academic
psychology for answers. Instead, they seek clarification from experts,
from the humanities, from admired models and occasionally from the
lessons gleaned in their own life histories. It has been suggested that this
is so because what people do in laboratories tells us little about what they
do elsewhere (Silverman 1977). Further, even our laboratory-derived
knowledge exhibits little of the cumulative character we associate with
the scientific method (Katz 1967) and without such reliability and con-
tinuity in the laboratory there can be no confident generalization beyond
it (Meehl 1978).
Despite mounting criticism, laboratory investigations have continued
to grow in esteem and occupy more and more of our journal space. At the
heart of social-psychological experimentation lies the pursuit of opera-
tional definitions. Bridgman’s operationalist philosophy could hardly
have shaped the course of psychological research more thoroughly or
enduringly (Bridgman 1927). Although the premisses on which this phi-
losophy rests have been powerfully challenged by philosophers of sci-
ence, nothing seems to avail against this anachronism (cf. Hanson 1973;
Hempel 1966; Kuhn 1962; Suppe 1977; and many others). One may well
wonder why. A main objective of this paper is to explore the incentives
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of a scientific strategy which delivers a scanty theoretical yield and
which lacks firm philosophical supports. The premiss underlying the
present discussion is that, whereas operationism can be criticized (or
defended) on logical grounds, its persistence in the face of methodologi-
cal critique and of its disappointing theoretical yield cannot. We must
seek answers outside the philosophy of science, for instance, in the
sociology of professions and in the explicit and implicit missions which
learned disciplines set for themselves (Leahy 1980).
The philosophical critique of operationism has led to a rejection of the
notion that theoretically neutral measurement observations can be
gradually refined and take their place in a theoretical edifice. Theoretical
and operational refinement go hand in hand, and there are no theory-free
operations. A host of other difficulties have been recognized as well. But
these criticisms have been largely without effect. Perhaps experimenters
are not impressed by philosophical rebuttals. My purpose in this paper is
neither to add yet another theoretical refutation nor to offer an alterna-
tive methodological programme. Methodological innovations can be
only partly relevant and will probably not be widely accepted until the
larger framework-the incentives and tacit hopes supporting the disci-
pline in its current form-is examined and modified. I shall argue that
the discipline of experimental social psychology is rclled by an unac-
knowledged, historically specific social-psychological imperative and
that ’broadening’ its methodological approaches in the manner sug-
gested by a host ofreformers will not suffice to rescue itfrom its peculiar
predicament.
To make this argument plausible and to point an approximate way out
of the predicament, a particular difficulty encountered by operationalist
social psychology must be made clear in a manner somewhat neglected
in the critical literature. The difficulty concerns the role of pretheoreti-
cal knowledge in the progress of social-psychological science. It is
important to be clear about this and to see it as something more than a
handicap for operationism; it reveals something about the subject matter
of social psychology and eventually about the extrascientific incentives
guiding the discipline. To accomplish this clarification I rely on the
case-study method, drawing on excerpts from one voluminous research
literature. Since what stimulates a new study is usually the critical
evaluation or reinterpretation of a previous study, attention will focus on
these evaluations. I therefore begin with an ‘inside view’, a study of how
adherence to the operationalist principle influences the actual progress
of research on a theoretical problem and what specific difficulties it
involves. This will lead to an exploration of the extrascientific incen-
tives which sustain operationism in social psychology. Viewing the field
in its societal context may be judged helpful if it accounts for the general
persistence in a relatively unproductive scientific strategy and if it
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contributes to a more receptive climate for non-operationist ap-
proaches. This is, however, a matter of historical processes, and I shall
refrain from making specific proposals or predictions.
To comprehend the persistence of operationism, it is well to keep the
attractions of the laboratory in mind-especially by contrast with the
helter-skelter social world on which experimental findings are intended
to shed light. These attractions consist of a constant, standardized
stimulus field, the regulated manipulation of selected independent vari-
ables, and the simplification and objectification of dependent variables.
These conditions are placed in the service of shedding light on certain
complex and unruly phenomena occurring in ’real life’ . For the findings
to be generalizable, the laboratory conditions should be relatively un-
ambiguous empirical realizations of theoretical variables encumbered
by minimal situational artifacts. Most experimenters believe that
theoretical progress (in any scientific field) depends on the development
of relatively robust, all-purpose laboratory operations. It is a common
observation, however, that many of these operations in human psychol-
ogy have been nearly as complex and ambiguous as the original real-life
phenomena which they were meant to illuminate. This difficulty is
widely recognized in the literature but has not been adequately explored
in regard to its limits. Proposed solutions have accordingly seemed
utopian and remained largely ignored, for instance, Aronson and
Carlsmith’s discussion of ’purification’ (1968, pp. 15-16) or balanced
replications (p. 21).
To put it simply, the concept of generalizability is not adequate to the
problem. ’Real life’ is the stimulus to research as well as its proving
ground. It therefore makes a difference whether we speak of findings
generalizing from one laboratory setting to another or to ’real life’. The
logical distinctions between reliability and validity or between construct
and external validity do not adequately reflect the fact that the previous
study stood in the same dual relation to ’real life’ (as both its stimulus
and proving ground) as the present study which is supposed to improve
on it. Finally, the distinction between stimulus and proving ground is
itself unsatisfactory because it obliterates the decisive fact that the
psychologist represents and exemplifies the inhabitants of the ’real
world’-the object of theory-while he is at the same time the ruler of
the laboratory which is supposed to give us a handle on that world-the
subject of theory. I call this fact decisive because it sets up a specific
tension in the practitioners of the discipline which is rarely discussed
except in strictly methodological terms. This too will be taken up in the
case study and subsequently discussed as to its broader significance.
For illustrative purposes, I have selected the history of research on
forced compliance. This seems to have slowed down sufficiently to
permit a retrospective analysis. I do not, however, propose to give a full
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or even systematic survey of the literature. Rather, I have chosen steps
in the history of this research which exemplify operationist strategy and
which illustrate its implications for the production of theoretical knowl-
edge. I claim only that, in regard to this aim, my summary is not biased. I
shall look at parts of it in detail to evaluate how the actual practice of
research appears in the light of the classical philosophy of science and
what it can tell us about the tension between ’real life’ and the laboratory
which is peculiar to social psychology. Toward the end of the paper I
shall briefly touch on related problems in other social sciences.
ESTIMATING PROGRESS IN SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
I leave for later whether the case of cognitive dissonance (CD) theory
and forced compliance research is a fair specimen. As will be recalled,
experimental social psychologists have demonstrated that if people are
paid to make public statements contrary to their own opinions, they will
subsequently come to believe these statements; paradoxically, the less
they are paid to tell these lies, the more they believe them. The explana-
tion for this finding is that the person who gets paid a large amount has
sufficient external incentive to help him justify his prevarication
whereas the person who gets paid little justifies his lies by persuading
himself that they are at least partly true. Both must reduce ’cognitive
dissonance’--the unpleasant inconsistency between belief and
avowal-but the latter person is forced to do so by changing his mind,
while the former, who ’did it for the money’, keeps his original opinion
intact.
In Hempel’s terms, we can identify the internal principles of the
theory as linking the various mental entities (cognitions, feelings) among
themselves. The bridging principles theoretically link these mental en-
tities with the stressful belief-avowal inconsistency in the forced com-
pliance situation. The measurement operation consists of the average
shift in attitude ratings following the experimental manipulation in the
laboratory. If this effect is shown to be consistent, we have framed a law.
Of course, it states only an empirical regularity; it is not an explanation
in itself. The theory of CD is offered as an explanation of the laboratory
effect.
The general cognitive dissonance hypothesis, which has instigated
this research, was first put forward by Festinger in 1957. The first and
perhaps best known confirmation of it was published by Festinger and
Carlsmith in 1959. It as been chronicled that ’Festinger and Carlsmith’s
confirmation of [the dissonance] prediction has generated more empiri-
cal research and theoretical controversy than any other finding in social
psychology’ (Eagly and Himmelfarb 1978, p. 532), and yet the dis-
couraging verdict after years of intensive research was that ’the distribu-
tion of dissonance, neutral, and [contradictory] effects obeys a normal
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curve’ (Sears and Abeles, 1969, pp. 265-66). On the one hand, only the
most hardbitten sceptic would totally dismiss the hypothesis today. The
forced compliance effect has been demonstrated in an astonishing range
of settings. By now there is also a great deal of atheoretical and informal
know-how relevant to producing it: surveying the experimental litera-
ture, Wicklund and Brehm list the subject’s personal commitment, the
salience of initial attitudes, choice, awareness of the dissonant relations
and foreseeability of consequences among the critical requirements for
producing any effect in the forced compliance situation (Wicklund and
Brehm 1976).
On the other hand, we have only little to show in the way of detailed
theoretical knowledge about the cognitive processes said to underlie the
effect. We are in fact still far from answering even the most fundamental
questions raised by CD theory, for instance, what is meant by saying
two cognitions are incompatible with one another, not to mention de-
grees of incompatibility. Equally little is known about alternative ways
in which an incompatibility will be resolved under given circumstances.
For instance, Festinger asked which of two given conflicting beliefs,
perceptions or memories would be more easily altered in reducing CD.
Surely, this will depend on how firmly a cognition has come to be held by
a person and on how central it is in his or her system of beliefs. So one
may wonder what will happen when one central cognition conflicts with
several weaker, peripheral ones. We have no clear conception of how
the relevant factors interact in the production and resolution of CD, nor
a comprehensive, higher-level integration of CD theory with theories of
perceptual, memory or affective processes, nor with theories of social
choice and group formation. Yet these are the concerns on which Fes-
tinger’s theory touched (1957, pp. 262-66). He also entertained a number
of astute typological hypotheses regarding which little evidence has
become available (1957, pp. 266-75). The ratio of effort to progress in
dealing with these questions has been disappointing (cf. Meehl 1978).
To put it briefly, there is little refinement of the internal principles of
CD theory and no significant reduction of CD theory to a more inclusive
theory. An unfortunate consequence of this point is that we have learned
practically nothing about how to escape CD other than by self-deception
or confusion. One might suppose that cognitive contradictions could be
rationally resolved. But of this there is no mention in the literature.
There are currently signs of a trend to reduce the scope of CD theory, for
instance, assigning its application to a certain range only of cognitive
incompatibility (Fazio, Zanna and Cooper 1977). I am not the first to cite
this research history as casting a shadow on the promise of experimenta-
tion in social psychology (e.g., Harr6 and Secord 1972, pp. 53-54; Gergen
1982, pp. 116-20).
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HYPOCRISY, SELF-DECEPTION AND PERPLEXITY
And yet the CD hypothesis has not been abandoned and remains as
intriguing as ever. I suggest that it appeals widely and persistently
because it addresses a common perplexing phenomenon of ’real life’.
For instance, you flatter someone you have disliked and subsequently
find some redeeming features in his character. (The sour-grapes
phenomenon is another, even better known example of this kind of
self-deception.) The occasions on which we say what we do not (quite)
believe are numerous-for instance, hypocrisy, enthusiasm, guilt and
boastfulness. To the extent that such insincere avowals alter our opin-
ion, we are apt to experience a change in our public posture and in our
affiliations-though not for good! In time, the grounded beliefs we
formerly held are apt to re-emerge, altering our postures and alliances
again. Social pressure vying with the inertia of our own parti pris is apt
to result in inconstancy and confusion about where we really stand. Not
only in others’ eyes, but in our own, our authenticity is in jeopardy.
Thus, the CD hypothesis may be interesting because it deals with a
social-cognitive predicament which we encounter relatively frequently,
which is difficult to avoid (largely because of social pressures), which we
may recognize as a source of self-deception, but which we are often
unable to prevent or reverse, i
I further suggest that the hypocrisy/self-deception phenomenon is a
typical instance of human perplexity-a psychological state or process
which we grasp partly, but not sufficiently, even after much trying, and
which we cannot escape. Cognitively, we cannot make the pieces add up
to a whole or get control of the predicament. Our insights remain
unconnected. Perplexity so defined signals the rudiment of understand-
ing as well as its frustrating curtailment. (What distinguishes perplexity
from simple ignorance is this half-seeing and half-knowing.) Perplexity is
what we experience when we realize that a poem or an overheard
conversation has a meaning but one about which we must remain un-
clear in our mind.
Perplexity is not merely a state of mind, but a characteristic of the
social order. We are often hard put to know what is in our best interest,
and how to deal with opportunities and difficulties in various sectors of
our lives. Normally we function in society without understanding its
dynamics and the part we play in them. Perplexities are therefore not
idiosyncratic, but social in nature. They are kept from evolving into
clearly formulated problems by a built-in self-preservative factor, and
thus block ameliorative action. For instance, we may regard them as
inevitable, or we construct them out of widespread irrational beliefs.
This muddles objective problems cognitively without any significant
reduction in subjective dissatisfaction or suffering.
1 I do not deny that CD also appealed to psychologists because of its role in the history of
attitude change research.
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Yet efforts to clarify perplexities into formulated problems commonly
encounter resistance front the perplexed individuals (Sennett and Cobb
1973; Earnest 1982). This is consistent with the fact that perplexities are
socialized. Among the pillars of individual perplexity are certain kinds
of naivete, apathy, prejudice, platitude, dogma and a variety of stabiliz-
ing sentiments and beliefs buttressed by unconscious defences. None of
these is independent of social norms. Thus, perplexities maintain the
social order while they maintain themselves, all the while fanning a
widespread restlessness. The social prevalence of more or less coher-
ent, realistic ideological belief systems indirectly suggests the pressures
which contradictions and obscurities in social life put on people’s cogni-
tive capacities.
I suggest that the forced compliance phenomenon derives its persist-
ent interest from the fact that it exhibits the formal characteristics of a
perplexity-it illustrates how social cohesion may be obtained at the
expense of the individual’s rationality and self-transparence. Disso-
nance theory as applied to forced compliance opens up the possibility of
achieving intellectual and eventually practical mastery over this
troublesome phenomenon.2 The theory appears relevant to contempo-
rary individuals in an even more encompassing sense because it deals
with the irrational manner in which we often resolve contradictions in
our social experience. For instance, if an individual does not enjoy the
advantages which his society claims to bestow on him, he must resolve
the contradiction and perhaps finds it easiest to do so by deceiving
himself. The problem is pervasive as well as pressing. Since self-
deception does not remove its nagging stimulus, the expectation of
grasping irrationality conceptually opens up the prospect of resolving
societal dilemmas more effectively and satisfactorily. At any rate, it is
not easy to account for the enormous interest which forced compliance
has been able to mobilize in the learned community if one tries to
segregate the history of this research from the life world of the inves-
tigators and consumers. In the last section of this paper I shall indicate
why the real-life relevancy of this problem is not only an inspiration, but
an obstacle to theoretical progress.
OPERATIONALIZATION AND CRITICISM
To lay the groundwork for such an analysis, we must examine the
influence of operationalist strategy on the progress from one study to the
next. Our focus will be on the criticisms of particular operations. In an
2 The relevance of CD theory to human suffering has been acknowledged from the
outset. It was first formulated to account for certain rumours about imminent catas-
trophes which were being spread in India shortly after an earthquake had occurred
there. Festinger offered the explanation that ’... as a result of the earthquake, these
people were already frightened, and the rumors served the function of giving them
something to be frightened about’ (Festinger 1957, p. vii).
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investigation I have already mentioned, Festinger and Carlsmith hired
undergraduate students to convey to ’a waiting subject’ that a dull task
they had been occupied with for an hour was in fact interesting and to
persuade the new ’subject’ that she would find it interesting and enjoy-
able as well. Students who had been paid one dollar to make this
communication subsequently showed a more positive evaluation of the
dull task than did students who had been paid twenty dollars.
Soon after the study was published, doubts were raised in some
quarters as to the operationalization. In particular, it was suggested that
twenty dollars was an unrealistically high wage to pay for the little
service that was asked. Subjects might construe the situation: ’[The
task] must have been [dull] if they are paying me so much for [touting it
as interesting]’ (Brehm and Cohen 1962, p. 74).On the strength of this
’definition of the situation’--so ran the critique-the high-reward sub-
jects would come to think of the task as all the more unpleasant, and this,
rather than the alleged CD effect in the low-reward group, accounted for
the difference between the groups. In other words, the critics held that
because the laboratory operation had an unintended side effect, the
theory had not been tested at all.
To set matters right, Cohen carried out an experiment similar to the
Festinger and Carlsmith study, but using a larger range of inducements
and including smaller values. Yale undergraduates were paid ten dollars,
five dollars, one dollar or fifty cents to write an essay favouring the
intervention of the police in a recent student riot. Cohen found that
subjects who had been paid fifty cents showed greater attitude change in
the direction of the advocated opinion than did subjects who had been
paid one dollar. This study was intended to dispose of the twenty dollar
problem. Cohen concluded that the dissonance hypothesis was con-
firmed because his study was free from this defect: ’No more suspicion
can be attached to a $1 offer than to a 50g offer’, he wrote (Cohen 1962,
p. 77).
Although this study supposedly rehabilitated the theory, Rosenberg
soon published an article in which he criticized both of the previous
studies. He speculated that subjects might have interpreted Cohen’s
offer of money as a bribe, as an attempt to test whether their fierce
anti-police attitudes would remain steadfast or whether they could be
bought off. This would engender suspicion and anger. As a result the
subjects would demonstrate their autonomy by holding fast to their
anti-police attitudes, hoping to frustrate the experimenter at the same
time (Rosenberg 1965).
To remedy this fault, Rosenberg carried out a study in which the
subjects were led to believe they were participating in two unrelated
experiments. Presumably this procedure would eliminate the disturbing
artifacts in Cohen’s study. The results contradicted the CD hypothesis.
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However, it was not long until Rosenberg’s study was in turn dismissed
on various grounds (Aronson 1966; Brehm 1965). Carlsmith, Collins and
Helmreich (1966) then proposed a new formulation reconciling Festinger
and Carlsmith’s and Rosenberg’s findings. Unfortunately this recon-
ciliation failed to account for other findings. Ad hoc theories were
advanced as to the slight variations in procedure which might have
caused other replications of Festinger and Carlsmith to fail (Nuttin 1964;
Janis and Gilmore 1965).
A further stage in this brief survey of progress in forced compliance
research is represented by the investigations of Barry Collins (1969),
who speculated on various other kinds of stress a subject might have
experienced in the situation contrived by Festinger and Carlsmith. A
subject might have feared social retaliation, or his self-esteem might
have suffered from having made a fool of himself before ’that attractive
female coed’, or he might have been distressed lest his misleading
statements could cause someone unpleasant consequences. Collins re-
ported more than a dozen experiments in which experimental conditions
were further varied. But these new studies made no noteworthy prog-
ress toward the perfection of a reliable operation.
Typically, the operations employed in each study were underdeter-
mined, that is, open to alternative interpretations. A subsequent investi-
gation, carried out to decide the issue, was underdetermined in a dif-
ferent way so that the data it furnished did not arbitrate among the
alternative interpretations previously offered. Although physics too
knows theories which are richer than the available evidence, the two
fields differ greatly as regards the theoretical level at which the underde-
termination occurs (e.g., the particle theory oflight vs. what a particular
subject thought about the events taking place on a certain day in a
Stanford University laboratory). In the next section of this paper I shall
show that pretheoretical knowledge plays a distinctive role in maintain-
ing this underdetermination especially in regard to the humanly most
perplexing and therefore most interesting phenomena.
THE LOGIC OF CRITICISM
It is a commonplace that science thrives on criticism. Yet given the
unsatisfactory progress of experimental human psychology, it is worth
examining the logic of the criticisms we have sampled.
(1) Positive Findings
The most important point to be noted is that the original ’twenty dollars
criticism’ and most of the other critical analyses, whether supportive or
sceptical of CD theory, were not stimulated by failed predictions. Fes-
tinger and Carlsmith observed the events they had forecast. But instead
of being accepted as corroborative, the events were discounted on the
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assumption that other events would have been observed if it had not
been for situational artifacts. This assumption was based on common-
sense considerations, on an understanding-of-social-situations rather
than on established scientific knowledge concerning the credibility of
financial rewards. Thus, pretheoretical knowledge prevailed over
hypothetico-deductive logic.3
Imaginative, intuitive and even irrational factors may play a role not
only in the context of discovery, as has always been conceded, but in the
context of justification as well (Reichenbach 1938). ’Statements about
events’ are not always decisive in the latter (Popper 1958, pp. 88ff.). It
may be countered that the critiques of Rosenberg and others were
actually attempts at alternative explanation and that we are therefore
moving into new contexts of discovery. I shall take this point up shortly.
(2) Untested Assumptions
The insights on which these critiques rest are not derived from scientific
investigations; rather they are in need of testing. In this sense, they are
subjective. But subjective is not idiosyncratic. We may surmise that
overpaying someone will make him suspicious. We do not know it in any
systematic way (yet). But it seems plausible to anyone experienced in
human affairs, and plausibility is sufficient to undermine our faith in
certain laboratory findings. McGuire (1976) and Gergen (1982) recognize
this point fully. Cook and Campbell (1979) acknowledge it as well,
though without its full implications, in their distinction between ’inter-
nal’ and ’construct’ validity.
Pretheoretical assumptions complicate the evaluation of findings in
other sciences as well. They constitute a ’supporting chorus of back-
ground beliefs’ (Quine and Ullian 1970, p. 68). For this reason, it is held
by many that crucial experiments cannot be carried out, that a corrobo-
rated hypothesis has merely withstood a challenge, and that a falsified
one need not be discarded (Greenwald 1975; Greenwald and Ronis 1981).
What distinguishes social psychology from other sciences is that the
’background beliefs’ are largely grounded in the critic’s everyday ex-
perience with ’real life’ outside the laboratory. Human beings, who are
subjects and objects of inquiry-the knowers and the to-be-known-
talk back to the investigator about how they are being studied:’ As one of
your subjects I would have experienced such-and-so!’ The massive
acquaintance with life on which critics base their challenges of labora-
tory studies commonly command the assent of others to an extent which
the objective findings themselves cannot always muster. The experi-
3 I believe this is the reason why studies in human psychology (and in other human
sciences) are often judged harshly by outside critics even when they are logically
immaculate.
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mental physical scientist need not contend with a comparable stock of
competing ’real-life’ knowledge.
(3) Subjective Processing
Let us be clearer about this ’real-life’ knowledge. Rosenberg brought a
wealth of knowledge to bear on the situation-knowledge about the
appropriateness of monetary rewards for various services; knowledge
about the interpretations people place on being ’overpaid’, on being
offered bribes, on being betrayed by peers; knowledge about the suspi-
cion in which people hold psychological experiments; and knowledge
about how all (and more) of these elements may be combined. This
knowledge does not pertain to the CD hypothesis, but to the features
making up experimental situations qua social encounters. Not only is
this knowledge, acquired in a lifetime, nearly beyond articulation, but it
was summoned and ’computed’ according to rules about which cogni-
tive psychology tells us very little. What knowledge would be relevant
to the understanding of this situation was spontaneously ’decided’ by
Rosenberg and each of the other critics. There are no guidelines or
known programmes for the empathic re-enactment of another’s experi-
ence, and it is rarely appreciated by experimentalists just how vast is the
domain of informal knowledge on which they depend and which may be
challenged.
Thus, the knowledge which enters into the formulation of these criti-
cisms is subjective, first, in a negative sense: It lacks any theoretical
basis; it is ’in need of testing’. Second, it is subjective in a positive sense,
namely as originating and being processed in the implicit ways just
described. It may be countered that hypotheses are often invented in this
way. But, as I shall shortly argue, the interpretations which Rosenberg
and other investigators proposed are not ’alternative hypotheses’ in the
usual sense.
By subjective we do not mean private or arbitrary (Natsoulas 1978).
We are free to collect further evidence and to decide whether we accept
Rosenberg’s interpretation. In fact, his interpretation is today consid-
ered, along with Festinger and Carlsmith’s findings, a significant mile-
stone in the history of CD research, its ’subjective’ status notwithstand-
ing.
If we wish to pursue the sources of Rosenberg’s insight further, we
may dig into his own psychology by means of life-historical case study
and/or into the protocol of Cohen’s study for clues to the impression of
bribery his procedure allegedly conveyed to his subjects. Subjective
insights are not conversation stoppers. On the contrary, the pursuit of




Perhaps the criticisms we have reviewed are simply alternative explana-
tions of empirical findings such as occur in all sciences. If so, then
Rosenberg was testing a rival hypothesis. But this is not so! As a rule,
critics analyzing previous forced compliance experiments usually of-
fered alternative (conceptual) interpretations of the earlier findings, for
instance, by pointing out an operational flaw. But instead of collecting
direct evidence in support of these interpretations, they carried out new
experiments testing the same hypothesis but free of the particular
blemish they had cited. In other words, the critic reported a plausibly
improved design. For this reason, it was rarely possible to draw infer-
ences from a later, ’improved’ design concerning the alleged defective-
ness of a previous design, and our skill in producing CD effects is
accordingly only marginally more dependable today than it was at first.
This is not astonishing. It takes only a moment’s reflection to realize
that tests of hypotheses about operations are as open to interpretation as
hypotheses about CD. The most satisfactory evidence concerning what
Cohen’s subjects felt and thought about the experimental set-up might
be obtained from interviews. Rosenberg rejected this method as ’open to
the very kind of contamination it seeks to disclose’ (Rosenberg 1965,
p. 30). Yet Rosenberg’s hypothesis was clearly a historical one; it con-
cerned the particular undergraduates in Cohen’s laboratory. Testing
such a hypothesis in a manner convincing to operationalists is a formid-
able and therefore largely untried challenge.
The retroduction model described by Hanson does not fit these cases
either (Hanson 1971). Usually revised hypotheses are retroduced after
events have been observed which are anomalous with respect to an
original forecast. We have already seen that this was not the case in
several of the studies cited. On the contrary, the events were in accord
with the hypotheses but anomalous with respect to pretheoretical
knowledge.
(5) Technical Wisdom
Neopositivists have argued against Bridgman that theoretical and opera-
tional progress are reciprocal. What our case study suggests is that
operations are at times refined at the behest of informal, subjective
knowledge, but that this refinement has failed to bring any remarkable
theoretical pay-off. This has ambiguous consequences for the growth of
knowledge. On the one hand, workers in the field of CD research have
gathered informal technical wisdom regarding various experimental
procedures. This wisdom remains implicit, however:
Although investigators who have had experience working with the theory seem
to have little difficulty intuiting its boundary conditions, they have had consider-
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able difficulty communicating this to other people; indeed, a situation has
evolved which can best be described by the statement: ’if you want to be sure,
ask Leon’. [Aronson 1969, p. 5.]
On the other hand, the algorithm of cognitive dynamics-the mutabil-
ity of various kinds of cognitive elements; the profundity, extensiveness
and persistence of their changes; the resistance of elements to change; or
the sources of this resistance-have not been substantially articulated.
Those who take a holistic view of scientific knowledge as an interre-
lated system of propositions without immune sectors may recommend
tolerance and deny a categorical distinction between ’foreground’ and
’background’ assumptions (Quine 1961). But this does not alter the fact
that the central questions which launched this research programme and
which remain largely unanswered were concerned with the dynamics of
cognition, and not with the sorts of variables which have inadvertently
arisen in the evaluation of experimental designs.
The accumulation of technical knowledge is not an idle pursuit, of
course. Every advanced science requires it. For instance,
An experiment in physics is the precise observation of phenomena accompanied
by an interpretation of these phenomena; this interpretation substitutes for the
concrete data really gathered by observation abstract and symbolic representa-
tions which correspond to them by B’Írtue of’the theories admitted by the
observer. [Duhem 1962, p. 147; second italics added.]
Our case differs in three respects: (a) No operational theory exists,
and the accumulated studies have not resulted in one. Therefore, ex-
perimental social psychology, unlike physics, has very few ’stubborn
facts’ (Cook and Campbell 1979, pp. 24-25). This is partly so because
(b) the technical wisdom accumulated is not directly relevant to CD or
forced compliance as such, but to plausible deceptions of many kinds
which occur only rarely in any specific theoretical context. For instance:
Whenever an experimenter promises a reward to a subject, he must
beware of appearing to offer a bribe! (c) As already mentioned, the
technical wisdom remains of uncertain generality because it is rarely
tested directly.
Despite these reservations, the pursuit of an adequate operation has
been the life force behind this research history and has given shape to the
acquired knowledge. That is why, despite the seeming futility of the
search, experimental progress depends on it. While pretheoretical
knowledge plays a most conspicuous role in the criticism of previous
studies, it is just as indispensable to the construction of new ones. This is
especially true when novel concepts are introduced, as by Festinger,
which require the invention of novel operations rather than recourse to
tried-and-true ones (e.g., IQ, Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale). These will
be especially vulnerable to reinterpretation. Gergen regards pretheoret-
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ical knowledge as very powerful when he asserts that psychologists
obtain support for hypotheses because they are familiar with their cul-
ture and can not only guess correctly how, when and where to gather
evidence for a hypothesis, but that they could equally well find evidence
for its negation (Gergen 1982).
(6) Limits off subjectivity
We have seen that the abundance of pretheoretical knowledge is a
blessing and an embarrassment for social psychology. While it seems an
inexhaustible resource in the design of effective experiments as well as
in the framing of equally effective criticisms of experiments, it is in fact a
budgeted resource. Each study is followed by another, and each criti-
cism is superseded by a new one. But eventually the chain stops. For the
time being, one investigator has the last word-not because his findings
are the last word but because no one seems able to think af a reinterpre-
tation of his design and because his findings have reached an acceptable
degree of reliability. These termination criteria are at best conventional,
at worst arbitrary. In short, subjectivity governs not only the mobiliza-
tion of pretheoretical knowledge but its resignation, and this translates
directly into theoretical coarseness.
To summarize these six points, our review of forced compliance
research shows that, in addition to scientifically warranted generaliza-
tions, experimental psychologists rely on an extensive unsystematized
body of non-scientific knowledge of a kind and magnitude not encoun-
tered in the physical sciences when designing and criticizing experimen-
tal operations. Guided by this knowledge, they are at times prepared to
set aside confirmatory as well as disconfirmatory laboratory findings.
Their reinterpretations of previous experiments may be testable but are
in fact rarely tested. Some of these reinterpretations would require
non-behavioural and/or historical approaches to testing which contem-
porary scientific psychology has been unable to master until now. Al-
though many of these untested suppositions have had considerable
impact on the course of research, they have not cumulated into a set of
operations or an operational theory comparable to, say, the physicist’s
or physiologist’s. To the limited extent they have so cumulated, cogni-
tive theory has not benefited. The wealth of prescientific knowledge
demonstrated in these pages remains excluded from the officially ad-
mitted findings of the laboratory. Therefore, these are invariably less
informative than would be required to raise the level of the untested
knowledge which we already have, on which we constantly depend and
which is our touchstone when we evaluate laboratory findings.
Operationalist psychology draws heavily on the capital of ordinary
knowledge-much more than is officially acknowledged-but pays no
dividends and does not appreciate substantially.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
One can take two perspectives on the problematic role which prescien-
tific knowledge plays in the operationist programme. The common view
is to regard the resulting impasse as a barrier to be circumvented, for
instance, by more sophisticated methods, by liberalizing operationism,
by conducting phenomenological and naturalistic inquiries, framing
more complex hypotheses, utilizing computers, obtaining verbal ac-
counts and so on (McGuire 1976). The other perspective is to view the
characteristic turns in the progression of research as revealing a deeper
truth about the discipline and its relation to the subject matter. More
specifically, we witness a struggle in which ordinary untested knowl-
edge plays a dual and alternating role. If we can understand this self-
opposing play more thoroughly, we may be brought to a new position.
To repeat an earlier point, although operationism can be analyzed logi-
cally, its stubborn persistence in the face of its heuristic weakness and
its logical repudiation cannot. It has been suggested that psychologists
stick to an outdated, impractical and philosophically indefensible notion
of operationism because it is a talisman protecting them against the fear
that psychology might not be a science after all (Leahey 1980). While this
is surely close to the mark, it raises the further question whether psy-
chologists would not feel even more secure if they kept abreast of the
practices in other more developed sciences. For this reason I offer an
interpretation of this methodological problem which regards it as a
historical phenomenon. I shall argue that the persistence of
operationism results from particular social-psychological configurations
and tensions in our social existence itself. So long as these are not
acknowledged and addressed in their own terms, epistemological
analyses and methodological proposals are apt to fall short of the mark.
The discipline can be viewed as a form of social production coming to
terms with its own foundation in reality. Its knowledge is intended to
accomplish something, and this intention, whether explicit or not, pre-
supposes a specific apprehension of its subject matter, namely, the
relation of the individual to social processes. Social-psychological re-
search is not a self-contained abstract enterprise, but a motivated social
activity reflecting the real relations of individuals in society.
Before making any inferences from the history of forced compliance
studies to human psychology as a whole, we may wonder whether the
research literature reviewed in these pages is typical. The choice of
forced compliance as case study was not random. I selected it because
enormous effort and ingenuity have been invested in it. Further, it is
sometimes cited as a revealing example of how much objective research
can accomplish in the way of reliable psychological knowledge. Thirdly,
the CD hypothesis was and remains an extraordinarily intriguing and
insightful, if unrefined, statement about cognitive processes. Finally, it
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is a phenomenon which models a common troubling predicament of’real
life’. If this literature has failed to yield increasingly general, precise
knowledge, then, I suggest, we cannot entertain much hope for litera-
tures of lesser distinction. For these reasons, an interpretation of this
case history may be useful. Still, it will be useful to refer briefly to similar
problems in related fields.
Reconstructing the history of this research, one gets the impression
that researchers commonly vacillated between two investigative at-
titudes. They took one attitude when they designed an experiment and
another when they criticized it. An authoritative hypothesis (i.e., the
CD hypothesis) was given an empirical interpretation (i.e., forced com-
pliance). A concrete situation was created within which a consequence
of the hypothesis would be tested. Such situations necessarily incorpo-
rated features which were deemed irrelevant to the hypothesis, but
which were expected to be inconsequential.
Alternating with this affirmative attitude we saw its obverse. In the
sceptical attitude the researchers took the laboratory situation no longer
chiefly as representing a given hypothesis, but as a meaningful and
interpretable social event in its own right. Each word spoken in the
laboratory and each procedural nuance were scrutinized as to the range
of their likely significance to an imaginary subject. To the sceptic, the
situation was not primarily an operationalization of a theory, but what it
appeared to be.4 4
In the affirmative attitude, the investigator designs situations which
he believes to be relatively univocal so that questions regarding sub-
jects’ personal definitions can be minimized or dismissed. In the scepti-
cal attitude, these very questions are resurrected. Ambiguities which
have apparently been trimmed to the irreducible minimum in the af-
firmative phase reclaim our attention during the sceptical phase. In both
phases, informal cultural knowledge is consulted and imaginatively
employed. In one phase, imagination is in the service of constructing
empirical interpretations of theoretical variables with due respect to
plausibility, manipulability, credibility, impact and so on. In the other
phase, imagination ’borrows the eyes’ of a subject and searches for
likely subjective interpretations. To put this another way, in the affirma-
tive attitude we regard the laboratory setting as a simplified model of
’real life’ while in the sceptical attitude we regard it as a homogeneous
and continuous segment or component of the latter.
We have seen that in the course of successive attitudinal alternations,
each attempt to construct a law-like generalization was countered with
an attempt to disassemble the experimental situation, regarding it not as
4 Of course, the critic too may have operated with an implicit theory of some sort, but not
necessarily that which the experiment was meant to test, nor even a rival theory of
attitude change.
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a milestone in experimental science, but as an isolated and self-
contained occurrence. Whereas the designers of experiments sought
empirical relationships generalizable beyond the particular situations
sampled, critics insisted on scrutinizing each situation within its own
narrow limits. Thus, through repeated challenges to operations the
attainment of generalizable, precise knowledge was blocked or re-
tarded. But the struggle of attitudes was not one between reason and
darkness, or even between behaviourists and mentalists. In each case,
the two attitudes alternated in one and the same investigator. As critic,
the psychologist deciphered a prior operationalization as to its unex-
pected significance; as experimenter, he then committed himself to new,
supposedly less ambiguous operations of his own.
The train of critical reformulations impresses us with the invincible
complexity of real life. Yet we do not tire of striving to master these
complexities by a stroke of operationalist genius. As experimenters we
are hostage to two masters: (a) the empiricist’s creed and (b) our
everyday knowledge of social life. The dispute between the affirmative
and sceptical attitudes indicates that we have not fully assimilated our
social experience to the metatheory of logical empiricism. We seem not
quite to believe in any specific operationalization, and yet we hope to
find one. Our appreciation of real-life complexities therefore occupies
an uncertain, shifting position. What keeps this hapless struggle going?
Consider the practice of research as a human activity, carried on in a
particular social historical setting, rather than simply as the manifesta-
tion of an abstract logic. Not only the selection of topics, but the choice
of methods can be understood better when we regard social psychologi-
cal research from a social-psychological perspective-as an activity
carried on by individuals coming to terms with the conditions of their
own and others’ social existence.
What I have referred to as social or cultural knowledge, that is,
knowledge which may or may not be scientifically established, which is
generally shared by the members of the society and which guides our
interpretation of everyday social experience despite being unsystematic
and occasionally vague and self-contradictory-such knowledge is not
only more voluminous than that which we succeed in establishing scien-
tifically, but enjoys a normative privilege. Notwithstanding its ’inferior’
status from a scientific perspective, it furnishes our guidelines in con-
structing experimental investigations and represents an implacable
standard against which laboratory findings are evaluated.
Earlier I suggested a reason for this privilege. The CD hypothesis and
the forced compliance operation are interesting (not only to the experi-
menter) because they are perplexing for all of us in real life.5 Readers can
5 This may explain why the term ’cognitive dissonance’ has gained currency among
informed laymen. It covers our cognitive adjustments to faits accomplis.
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readily identify situations in their own lives in which they have publicly
committed themselves to something they did not believe. Forced com-
pliance represents the self-damaging effects of acquiescence to social
pressure, specifically the erosion of authenticity. The cognitive, affec-
tive and social consequences of insincere commitments are troubling
and neither wholly transparent nor easily avoided. This gives rise to
perplexity and to a search for relies. The learned members of society
who happen to dispose of the scholarly skills required for the clarifica-
tion and resolution of perplexities accept the mission. They are familiar
with this perplexity (since they are not personally exempt from its ill
effects).
Given this urgent task, the stakes in finding an adequate means of
studying the problem in the laboratory are higher and different from
those in solving problems in the natural sciences. In regard to socialized
perplexities, success has a reflexive benefit in which the experimenter
himself shares. It is not necessary that he be in acute turmoil in order to
recognize this. In the natural sciences, by contrast, the growth of tech-
nique and theory requires complex mediations before one’s own life is
materially enhanced. i Y~’e persist in the operationalist strategy because
we hope to compress and subdue within the confines of the laboratory
what plagues its uncontrollably and inescapably outside.8 We expect to
gain the upper hand over forces which ordinarily have its in their grip.9
Social and individual psychology therefore differ from other sciences
not only cognitively, but ‘motivationally’-by the nature of the stakes.
The striving for mastery over human perplexity, as defined earlier, sets
the social psychologist’s efforts apart from the physicist’s or biolo-
gist’s.10
We judge laboratory investigations of perplexing phenomena by the
leverage they give us on ’real life’. A satisfactory operation, one that
does not suffer from excessive ambiguities, would promise us at least
symbolic and eventually practical control over the sprawling problems
of life. The controlling image is that of a representative sample. We posit
6 Because perplexities are socialized, they are hedged in with stabilizing rationalizations
and widely taken as natural notwithstanding the malaise which they contain.
7 The contrast is attenuated in the case of a biochemist hastening to develop remedies for
an illness by which he is himself imminently threatened.
8 This is rather well illustrated by the hopeful statement of a renowned social scientist
who felt staggered by the complexities attending the study of ’whole communities and
nations’. He wrote: ’It is just possible we can manage ... the small group. The group
may be small enough to let us get all the way around it’ (Homans 1950, p. 3).
9 Students of archaic thought will not fail to note the element of magical thought inherent
in the search for means of powerful remote influence.
10 It is not uncommon that novice experimenters display an extrascientific enthusiasm as
they design ways to manipulate Anxiety, Aggression or Self-Esteem in fellow human
beings. Similarly, one can hear seasoned experimenters praise research designs as
exciting, cute and even sexy.
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a schematic, purified and therefore concentrated miniature of reality.
The small-scale operational efficacy we hope to perfect in the laboratory
can later be applied, at the desired level of magnitude, to the unmanage-
able world around us. We have begun to see why such leverage is not
achievable.
A perplexing phenomenon is a continual irritant. Everyday forced
compliance threatens one’s sense of identity and obstructs one’s de-
velopment. That is why it commands our attention. Again and again we
puzzle over it. We are familiar with its outlines but we do not penetrate to
the nucleus. We have gone as far as we could but the most recalcitrant
confusions remain. Thus, only the most illuminating findings will satisfy
us now by helping us rise to a higher level of understanding than we had
attained prior to the laboratory investigation. But such findings are
difficult to obtain.ll Lesser ones we dismiss as shallow or miscon-
ceived-as though a tourist tried to convey something new to us with his
cursory observations about a country or culture which we know inti-
mately from long study and acquaintance.
In brief, because we wish urgently to gain mastery over pressing
human perplexity, we are untiring in the pursuit of adequate
operation aliza tions, and because HJe are relatively sophisticated about
these perplexities, we tend to reject most of the attempted solutions as
inadeqarate. Coordinate with these alternately affirmative and sceptical
tendencies are the two regards in which we hold reality. In the affirma-
tive phase we view it as containable and adequately represented by our
newly contrived operations. In the sceptical phase we see this world as
having yielded only in small measure, as having been only seemingly,
not really, mastered. And the cycle is renewed; the struggle continues.
This dialectic explanation in terms of perplexity and mastery is in-
tended to be social-psychological. Methodological strategies are deeply
anchored in the history of thought and cannot be reduced to individual
motivations. Such strategies are no more ’invented’ by the individual
psychologist than are each person’s experiences of perplexity.
Operationalist strategy continues to be ~estfully pursued despite its
evident difficulties because of what it means, because it portends an
answer to urgent distresses prevalent in society. The relevance of a
methodological strategy to such existential concerns in no way di-
minishes the fact that this strategy is urged upon researchers by impera-
tives within the discipline (graduate education, editorial policies, peer
judgements, etc.). Meanings are, after all, never independent of social
practices.
Yet this explanation seems too broad. Other psychological disciplines
were not detained in comparable measure by the prescientific knowl-
11 For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Winch (1958) and especially
Bergmann (1976).
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edge of such processes which critics brought to bear on laboratory
findings. For instance, the question whether Hullian theory was
adequate to the mastery of pedagogical problems in our schools was not
a major deterrent to the refinement of that theory. Why should our
sophistication about perplexing realities outside the laboratory foil our
operationalist strategies in the laboratory? The question is pertinent
because in the traditional view, the laboratory offers the advantages of
controlled variation. It is assumed that the overwhelming complexity of
naturally occurring phenomena can be reduced to manageable propor-
tions. Stimuli can be manipulated singly or in combination, and distrac-
tions can be held at a minimum. Accordingly, our perplexity and our
sophistication about real-life phenomena should not pose major difficul-
ties in laboratory investigations. But this view is defective. Our case
history shows that it needs qualifications.
TWO REALITIES OR ONE?
In the traditional view, life settings and laboratory settings are regarded
as two distinct and independent realms. The same laws govern the
events and processes taking place in each. Yet it is thought possible to
arrange conditions in the laboratory which are as discontinuous from
those outside as is necessary for a particular investigation. Aronson and
Carlsmith distinguish two kinds of realism. They speak of experimental
realism when a laboratory procedure has an impact on subjects, involves
them and forces them to take it seriously. They speak of mundane
realism when the events in the laboratory are judged as likely to occur in
the real world (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968). According to these au-
thors, an operation can have an impact even though it is not representa-
tive of reality. For instance, the Asch situation, which makes subjects
‘squirm, sweat, and exhibit other signs of tension and anxiety’, is said to
be mundanely unrealistic; after all, ’it is rare to find oneself in a situation
where the direct and unambiguous evidence of one’s senses is con-
tradicted by the unanimous judgements of one’s peers’ (Aronson and
Carlsmith 1968, p. 22). Milgram’s situation is offered as another case of
high-experimental, low-mundane realism.
This is implausible except in the most literal sense. Granted, we do not
commonly administer excruciating shocks to poor learners, as Mil-
gram’s subjects thought they did. But this admission leaves us wonder-
ing from where such laboratory operations derive their indisputable
impact. Is it inherent in the situation? If a complex social event (in the
laboratory or elsewhere) has an impact, it cannot be totally separate
from the rest of the subject’s life experience. It must tap a stock of life
experience-in the case of the Asch situation-with pressures toward
conformity. (If it did not, the experimental findings would be uninterest-
ing.) The same may be said about mundane pressures toward com-
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pliance which constitute the meaning and impact of the Milgram situa-
tion.
Not only are laboratory situations and real-life situations components
of the same encompassing reality, but it is impossible to keep significa-
tions acquired in ordinary life experience from entering the laboratory
situation. This, after all, is the gist of most of the reinterpretations of
laboratory studies we reviewed earlier. The critics held that subjects
brought unwanted (theoretically problematic) interpretations into the
laboratory which were derived from their stock of general social knowl-
edge. To put it another way, the objection occasionally heard from
critics of laboratory research, that experimental operations are meaning-
less because they are contrived and artificial, is quite unfounded. On the
contrary, these operations are uncontrollably meaningful because they
cannot be insulated against our mundane understandings.
Of course, this meaningfulness depends on the domain of study and
on the response measures employed. There are great variations in the
degree of simplification and control which laboratory investigations can
achieve in comparison with the real-life phenomena to which they per-
tain. Undoubtedly, it is easier to take segmental functions, like verbal
learning, sensation or psychophysical judgement, out of their contexts
than functions which involve subjectively meaningful action, which
mobilize desires, fears or ideals to a significant extent, and in which
subjects consequently produce themselves as persons .1~
In fact, meanings of this sort are always presupposed by the experi-
menter, never created de novo in the laboratory. Why else would we
ever recruit naive subjects or give them deceptive instructions for our
operations? These instructions caption a series of tasks by placing them
in a context which, though spurious, is comprehensible to the subject in
terms of his or her social knowledge constituted outside the laboratory.
One can imagine that not only the degree of impact, but the results of a
new forced compliance study, would be dramatically altered if subjects
were previously acquainted with CD theory. Evidently, an experimen-
tal procedure acquires impact because it signifies one thing rather than
another, and significations always depend on pre-existent categories of
social experience. To speak of impact as if it were inherent foreshortens
the perspective. It deals only with activation, not with meaning. Most
operations in the social-psychological laboratory have impact because
of what they mean. This dissolves ’the apparent paradox that experi-
mental realism can be achieved through falsehood’ (Aronson and
Carlsmith 1968, p. 26).
12 Whether an experimental situation reduces real-life complexity is, therefore, not a
function of tasks as such, but of tasks in settings. For instance, what perceptual
judgments mean to the subject under opposing peer pressure sets the Asch situation
apart from more ordinary psychophysical investigations.
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The intricate stagings familiar from forced compliance or conformity
research are intended to create credible deceptions. Credibility, like
comprehensibility, requires the application of pre-established significa-
tions. The mundane world is, therefore, indispensable to the laboratory.
The conditions within the latter would crumble into senselessness with-
out the semiotic support of the former.
As we have seen, this semiotic continuity has two ironic conse-
quences : (a) Unwanted interpretations may be placed on the experi-
mental situation, and (b) since subjects do not have identical inventories
of mundane experience on which to draw, their interpretations of the
operations will differ among themselves in unknown ways. For this
reason, l~osenberg’s and the other criticisms are necessarily overex-
tended. Some subjects may indeed have thought Cohen was bribing
them, but we have no grounds for supposing that they all did! While this
is surely not a new psychological insight in principle, the practice of
operationism declines-again in principle !-to take account of it; a
single wanted meaning is imputed to all subjects. The distinction be-
tween experimental and mundane realism is untenable.
This observation-that the laboratory situation is defined by and
inseparable from the significations rooted in our ’real life’ experience-
tells us something positive about the nature of meanings and should not
be taken primarily as a verdict against operationism. What it tells us
concerns not only operationism, but any approach to the human sci-
ences based on the ’leverage’ notion. This is the notion that we can
create a small-scale relatively simple replica insulated against the jum-
bled world around us and that this world can be kept at bay until we have
perfected the means to order and subdue it. It is this notion which is
faulty. Social reality defies the seclusion of the laboratory, infiltrates its
significations into the supposedly protected zone and thereby contami-
nates and undermines the efforts at control. What happens in the labora-
tory is as complex and as ambiguous as what happens outside. Under-
graduates obliging a kindly psychologist by telling lies to a fellow student
probably put as many unregulated, divergent interpretations on the
events as do job applicants in an employment interview or guests at a
bridal shower.
The leverage notion is evidently more appropriate in fields of study
where meanings do not figure so prominently as in social psychology.
Natural scientists can create artificial self-enclosed worlds because they
deal with external, physical facts and processes. When we study human
subjects who interpret events, such segregations are not possible. To
admit a human subject into the laboratory is to admit at the same time the
meaning structures he carries in his ’real life’. We may attempt to
influence, but we cannot exclude, his interpretations of laboratory
events, and we cannot stop him or her from once again interpreting the
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arrangements themselves with which we attempt to influence the in-
terpretations. Our literature review makes this plain.
Social perplexities are especially subject to this limitation for two
reasons. One, as previously discussed, they revolve predominantly
around confused or obstructed meanings. A perplexing predicament
causes dissatisfaction in that we sense a meaning which eludes us. (We
do not feel perplexed by earthquakes or toothaches.) Two, perplexities
are inseparable from the totality of our life world. The sentiments and
beliefs which block us from penetrating one set of perplexing
phenomena, say, our own fears or vanities, play an important part in
other, even unproblematic contexts of our lives, say, our excellence at
work or our personal charm. What cannot be partitioned in ’real life’
because of ramifying and reticulated significations cannot be seques-
tered in the laboratory either.
The interpreted arrangements in the laboratory will be homogeneous
and continuous with, that is, of the same order as, ’real life’ rather than
simplified representations of it. There is no Archimedean platform from
which we can lift the social world out of its hinges. This is a discouraging
insight, and the more we chafe under our perplexities the more we resist
it.
In our search for an effective lever, we insist on experimental opera-
tions which preserve the essential complexity and impact of the real-life
equivalent. Investigators engineer highly complex situations. Not only
are tasks and instructions presented to subjects so as to mislead them
but, more importantly, the actual interactions among the participants
(subjects, experimenters, confederates, audience) invite unregulated
personal definitions. People are coaxed into making disingenuous com-
mitments and declarations, undergoing demeaning ordeals, doing and
accepting favours and so forth. Novelists thrive on the highly per-
sonalized interpretations people are wont to put on such experiences.
There are also objective ambiguities, however. For example, Aron-
son and Mills (1959) asked college girls to read a list of obscene words to
a male experimenter, intending this exercise to be an embarrassing
initiation rite. Critics pointed out that it could equally well have been an
arousing experience and that either reaction would account for the
obtained findings even though only the former would be relevant to CD
theory (Chapanis and Chapanis 1964). This ambiguity is not accidental;
arousal and embarrassment are ’naturally’ correlated. Earlier we saw
that money can serve as a reward because subjects are already familiar
with its value. But that same prior familiarity has also given rise to
expectations regarding the fairness and credibility of specific remunera-
tions. Thus, money ’naturally’ combines the reward function, which the
experimenter intends, with a credibility factor, which may act as a
contaminant. The search for the perfect lever dooms our prospects for
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determinacy. The lever must fit the object of mastery but as it comes to
resemble it too closely, it breaks under its own weight.
To speak of ’natural correlation’ and of ’infiltrating meanings’ is to
specify a particular kind of relatedness. A contrast will make this clear.
In another context, Bronfenbrenner has proposed an approach to
ecological validity in which organismic development will be studied as
a function of the ’interdependent, nested systems’ in which it occurs
(Bronfenbrenner 1977, p. 517). He advocates sensitivity to the recip-
rocal influences among persons and between persons and settings,
higher-order effects, indirect impacts and systemic relations. His pro-
posals rest on a biological (’ecological’) metaphor and presuppose a
causal model. He believes it possible to control extraneous influences,
that is, to limit one’s study to certain sets of subsystems and to expand
these sets at will. This is roughly comparable to the astronomer’s ap-
proach. One can roughly plot a planet’s orbit around the sun by limiting
one’s calculations to the model of a two-body problem. However, for
greater precision it is necessary to take into account the positions of all
the other planets in the solar system. This constellative model is one of
external relatedness.
By contrast, when we speak of meanings, a notion of internal related-
ness seems more relevant. If aehild’s behaviour within different settings
(family, school, peer group) is determined by the meanings they hold for
him/her, then we must respect the fact that these meanings are recipro-
cally constitutive. The meaning of a child’s peer group is apt to be related
to that of school and family, for instance, as a rallying point for collective
opposition or moral autonomy. Similarly, what school means is related
to parental values and expectations. The child’s concept of the remoter
context is therefore internal to that of the present context and cannot be
ousted from it. It makes no sense, however, to say that the concepts of
the planets are in this sense internal to one another.
Social scientists committed to experimental study sometimes plead
that these are special complex cases and that they must wait upon the
formulation of simpler regularities. But this differentiation into simple
and complex (or ’higher-order’) effects is itself an artifact of the preva-
lent natural-scientific approach. The present thesis is that in the study of
distinctively human phenomena-phenomena involving language-the
semiotic irradiation alluded to above cannot be experimentally par-
titioned into elements. If it could, the findings in the laboratory would no
longer bear on life.
The problematic alternation and opposition between affirmative and
sceptical attitudes can be seen in this light as hinging on the inves-
tigator’s shifting allegiance to analyses in terms of causes and meanings.
Respect for the efficacy of the latter creates intolerance for simplifica-
tions and standardizations whereas adherence to a causal model leads to
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acquiescence in prearranged limits of error. Vacillation between models
results in an endless debate about personal definitions.
The inclusion of meanings in a comprehensive theory of human action
is a methodological issue not only in operationist practice. As is well
known, Alfred Schutz explored this question in considerable detail, his
conclusion being that the sociologist must begin with a description of the
actor’s social world in his or her own terms before that description can
be incorporated into an account which fits the sociologist’s interests and
categories (1954). Similar problems of objectivism are encountered in
content analysis, where intentions tend to be ignored (Berelson 1952)
and in historical research, where events and documents are often taken
out of the context of opinion and belief which endows them with signifi-
cance (Gottschalk 1947).
The issues here under discussion are taken up in contemporary
sociology under the heading of micro- versus macro-research (Knorr-
Cetina and Cicourel 1981). When investigating phenomena on one level,
sociologists commonly employ methods which occlude processes oc-
curring on the other even though the latter may be intimately, even
constitutively, related to the former. For example, the processes by
which physicians gather medical histories from their patients are com-
plex and variable social interactions differing as to interrogatory style,
meticulousness, implicit and explicit preconceptions and so forth. But
none of this is retrievable from the completed document, let alone from
aggregated public health statistics. The converse occlusion is equally
common. Micro-researchers interested in the conversational rules ob-
taining in small groups frequently ignore the social-structural positions
of the conversationalists outside the group and the role which such
micro-interactions play in maintaining macro-structural features
(Cicourel 1964, 1981). At least one theory of society holds that the
impetus for social development comes from the evolving learning poten-
tial and competence of the society’s socialized members (Habermas
1981). Thus, the occlusions of the micro-level and of micro-macro in-
teractions have a political as well as epistemic significance.
Operationism undoubtedly contributes to this larger impasse by
foreshortening our perspective on subjective processes.
These prevalent paradoxical dynamics of social research can be
viewed in concentrated form in the social psychology laboratory. I have
argued that perplexing phenomena command our attention and energy
because they gravely complicate our lives. Gaining leverage over them
is a powerful inducement to their scientific study. To this end we create
social situations in the laboratory which turn out to be quite as complex
as those outside. We can perhaps control the arrangements, but never
the interpretations which subjects (and readers) place on them. The
resulting objective and subjective ambiguities are rarely resolved and
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thwart our search for the magic lever at least in regard to perplexing
phenomena. Prescientific knowledge impedes us even as it stimulates
and guides us. If this is so, then, ironically, scientific progress may
encounter the fewest such obstacles in domains in which we have no
‘headstart’ of sophistication because they hold no real-life interest for
us. By contrast, we may expect that whenever we bring a phenomenon
into the laboratory which is perplexing in real life, the same mundane
relevance which acts as an incentive to our inquiry will also defeat us.
Finally, we consider once more the mesmeric belief that the labora-
tory can be isolated from ’real life’ and that we can develop instruments
and insights within it which will later find application in our perplexing
social world. Is this not a belief growing out of the distinction between an
inner, symbolic (and innocent) world and an outer, real (and problem-
atic) one, out of the opposition of a rational mind and a scourged, impure
body? Surely the problem runs deeper than method. The discipline of
social psychology has placed itself in a bind by adhering to this dualism
from which the polishing of methods and research designs cannot free
us. That is why it would be self-contradictory and hasty to propose
superior approaches at this point. New methods can in time be de-
veloped out of a non-dualistic reconceptualization of social-
psychological research, that is, after the relinquishment of the leverage
illusion. An interpretive discipline seems most promising (Taylor 1979).
1 shall show elsewhere what this means in practice (Rosenwald 1985).
The scientific strategy currently being pursued suffers from the same
problems as the social world it seeks to study. Operationism reflects as
well as perpetuates a socially created, not an ontological, duality-the
sundering of the individual (investigator) into social atom and irrepressi-
ble subject. As the former, he makes compromises for Science; as the
latter he knows better and protests. To address this enforced duality
requires that the search for knowledge become identical with its applica-
tion, that research become a factor in resocialization. Seemingly, noth-
ing short of a revision of the self-concept of the social sciences will do.
Having traced the sources of the current strategy to the social order, we
can understand better why methodological exhortations do not work. At
the same time, this intransigence reveals the sheer power of perplexing
socialization: to cut through the Gordian knot, we have set our hopes
and tightened our grip on one of the dullest blades available.
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